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Derrida’s Law: 
The socio-historical and the meta-ethical; la and le politique. 
Abstract 
This article critically engages with a particular reading of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive legal 
theory which argues that his methodology marginalises engagements with the ‘socio-historical’ of 
law at best, or is incapable of such engagements at worst. After explaining this meta-ethical 
reading the piece offers a retort via a broader and more in-depth reading of Derrida’s legal 
theory. Here the article problematises the distinction at the core of the meta-ethical reading; this 
being that Derrida’s work established a mutually exclusive separation between a ‘socio-legal’ 
critique of law and one considered of ‘critical legal theory’. This separation will be shown to be 
misleading by firstly referring to Derrida’s essay ‘Force of Law’ and arguing that therein the 
‘socio-legal’ and ‘critical legal’ theories are in fact mutually dependant and that Derrida’s concept 
of surenchère illustrates this. Secondly, a wider reading of Derrida’s work will then illustrate that 
such a conceptual binary is incompatible with his deconstructive metaphysical critique. This will 
be evidenced with reference to what is argued to be the central point of the meta-ethical reading, 
something which is itself born from Derrida’s work; this being the distinction between la and le 
politique, ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. With due regard for the history of this important and 
complicated deconstructive distinction it will be argued that the reductive reading in the meta-
ethical critique does not do justice to the inherent paradox in maintaining a separation between 
‘socio-legal’ theory, la politique, and ‘critical legal theory,’ le politique.  
Keywords Derrida, law, deconstruction, socio-historical, la/le politique, metaphysics 
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Introduction  
The meta-ethical reading of deconstructive legal theory 
Jacques Derrida’s theory of deconstruction has had a profound impact on legal studies since it 
entered the jurisprudential fray in the 1980s. 1 The varying interpretations of deconstruction 
within legal studies have produced readings ranging from ‘methodological’ to ‘postmodern,’ and 
from ‘ethical-liberal’ to ‘cosmopolitan’, amongst many others (De Ville, 2011: 3–13). Within 
these readings deconstruction has been cited by a plethora of legal scholars, leading to 
‘references [which] have varied from the sympathetic to the downright hostile’ (2). This article 
investigates yet another interpretation of Derrida’s deconstructive legal theory and the 
corresponding reading of his juridical thought. 2 The investigation of this reading is acute and 
slow, for ‘[t]he slower the reading, the greater the receptiveness to the work’ (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 
198). 
 
The reading in question argues that Derrida’s deconstructive legal theory at best marginalises, 
and at worst prohibits, engagements with the ‘socio-historical’ (Norrie, 2000). That is, his theory 
does not, or cannot, ‘[expose] the ideological, superstructural nature of law by showing that it 
operates in the service of social, economic, and political forces that are posited as external and 
prior to the law’ (Fraser, 1991: 1325). In short, because Derrida’s work lacks ‘credence and 
validity in the kind of socio-historical approach [seen] as central to critique’ (Norrie, 2005a: 14) it 
consequently holds no utility for those concerned with social justice. This reading has been 
proposed by several scholars, beginning most vocally with the American critical theorist Nancy 
Fraser (Fraser 1984, 1989, 1991) and then continuing strongly thereafter with the well-known 
British socio-legal scholar Alan Norrie (Norrie, 1996, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2010). 3 
This reading of deconstruction is a ‘meta-ethical’ one, for as Norrie states: 
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Although Derrida says that deconstruction operates in part by looking historically at the genealogies of 
concepts, he does not relate deconstruction as an ethical project to the ‘possible or useful’ socio-historical 
project he also identifies. Thus, the socio-historical critique is marginalised by the deconstructive 
(metaphysical-ethical) approach which comes after it (Norrie, 2005a: 6). 4 
 
This reading highlights Derrida’s methodological preference for ‘metaphysics as ethical 
abstraction’ over and above a ‘socio-historical critique’ within legal theory (Norrie, 2003a: 130), 
which consequently ‘short-circuits’ legal analysis so that it ‘bypass[es] its sociohistorical character’ 
(129). Similarly, Fraser opines that ‘so long as Deconstruction remains committed to privileging 
even negative transcendental reflection … it will never get to ethics or politics’ (Fraser, 1991: 
1326). Thus deconstruction is itself ‘a metaphysical barrier to a serious critique of law’ (Norrie, 
2000: 96) and to an understanding that ‘[h]uman beings live in society and history, by and 
through norms, forms and relations that are historically structured and shaped, including those 
of the law’ (Norrie, 2005a: 79–80). The meta-ethical reading posits that deconstruction shuns 
law’s relation to the socio-historical and is left bereft, as an abstract methodology bearing no 
relation to the everyday.  
 
Article aims 
This article engages with, and offers a retort to, this reductive meta-ethical reading by illustrating 
why Derrida’s deconstructive engagement with law cannot but engage with the socio-historical of 
law. The importance of this retort is two-fold. Firstly, it impedes the consignment of 
deconstructive legal theory to an apolitical realm, or worse to political nihilism. Secondly, it 
attests to the ‘Derridean politics’ (Cusset, 2008: 126) which emanated from Derrida’s work, not 
least of all for legal studies but also for ‘feminists and thinkers of postcolonialism’ amongst 
others (126). 5 For Derrida was, lest it be forgotten, ‘an active and outspoken critic and 
commentator on issues such as South Africa’s apartheid, the Israel/Palestine conflict, the bloody 
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civil war in his native Algeria, human rights abuses, French immigration laws, the death penalty, 
and on what Richard Falk has termed “the great terror war”’ (Weber, 2013a: 1); it is submitted 
that his juridcio-political works on these issues constitute ‘socio-historical’ engagements.        
 
The retort will be comprised of two interconnected parts. The first relates to readings of 
Derrida’s most influential text on law: ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ 
(Derrida, 1990, 2002c). Here the retort is not that scholars have misread Derrida’s deconstructive 
legal theory per se but rather that a surface-level reading has led them to incorrectly establish two 
mutually exclusive critical routes for legal theory via a ‘bifurcation’ which creates a ‘socio-
historical’ and a ‘metaphysical-ethical’ route (Norrie, 2000: 86; Fraser, 1991: 1325). Against this 
an alternative reading will be proposed based upon a close reading of Derrida’s essay and his 
concept of surenchère.  
 
The second part is grounded on an attentive reading of Derrida’s work on the relationship 
between politics and philosophy. Here it will be argued that the aforementioned bifurcation 
between the two critical routes of legal theory is incompatible with Derrida’s metaphysical 
critique. Here the scholars’ concerns with the neglect of ‘real-world geo-historical effects’ in 
favour of the ‘abstract, mysterious [and] ungrounded’ (Norrie, 2010: 227, 228) will be transposed 
onto the division in deconstructive theory between la and le politique, that is between ‘politics’ and 
‘the political’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997a, 1997b). This transposition will illuminate the 
seminal division which, it is argued, motivates their critique that Derrida’s legal theory ‘disable[s] 
or impede[s] the possibility of political thought about the relation between violence and law’ 
(Fraser, 1991: 1327). However, in referring to prior attempts to cleanly separate la and le politique 
using Derrida’s deconstructive theory, it will be shown that such a thing is a near impossible task. 
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For there is a profound deconstructive connection between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ rather 
than ‘the tendency in Derrida to neglect material and cultural structures’ (Norrie, 2010: 87).         
 
This article begins by explaining the meta-ethical reading through two brief sections: the first 
accounts for the origins of this reading from the 1980s and 1990s and the second then elucidates 
the theoretical grounds for this reading.         
 
A reductive reading of Derrida 
Origins of the meta-ethical reading 
The meta-ethical reading of deconstructive legal theory begins with early critiques of Derrida’s 
work. In 1984 Fraser noted that ‘there is one sort of difference which deconstruction cannot 
tolerate: namely, difference as dispute, as good, old-fashioned, political fight’ (Fraser, 1984: 142). 
Then, from one of Norrie’s earliest accounts with regards to deconstructive legal theory in 1996 
we recall that:   
 
In seeking a critical standpoint in what lies ‘beyond’ poststructuralism ultimately has a problem in coming to 
terms with the forms of the social world as they are. Either it insists on the deconstruction of existing forms 
of subjectivity and reason (including those of the law), and therefore that the criteria for progressive political 
and moral change exist beyond ‘what is,’ in a necessarily inchoate ‘other;’ or it illicitly returns to what exists, for 
example, legal rights, seeing this as strategically necessary for moral and political practice in the meantime. 
The latter approach is illegitimate in terms of the method of deconstruction, but cries out to be implemented 
in the face of real, pressing injustice (Norrie, 1996: 544).       
 
Accordingly deconstruction is portrayed as distanced from ‘the forms of the social world as they 
are’ and removed from ‘political fight[s]’, as well as concerns of justice with regards to law. This 
diagnosis unearths the reoccurring transcendental element within the meta-ethical critique of 
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deconstructive legal theory: ‘Deconstruction that privilege[s] the transcendental, even in this 
qualified form, incur[s] a disability when it comes to thinking politically’ (Fraser, 1991: 1326).        
 
Law’s violence and transcendence  
For Fraser, Derrida’s work illustrates a ‘so-called “violence” in law that is constitutive and 
inescapable’ (Fraser, 1991: 1328). It plagues all juridical systems and legal structures; ‘the level at 
which violence is implicated in law is very deep; the suggestion is that violence constitutes the 
enabling ground or condition for the possibility of justice’ (1325). This pushes Derrida to engage 
in a deconstructive approach which ‘penetrates deeper than the [socio-historical] approach to the 
heart of the relation between violence and law’ (1325). But for Fraser this approach becomes a 
‘quasi-transcendental reflection on violence as a necessary condition for justice’ at the expense of ‘a 
normative orientation’ (1325, 1326) 6 because Derrida’s account law’s violence ‘is independent of 
any specific institutional or social arrangements and … is not subject, even in principle, to 
change’ (1328). Accordingly, Fraser believes Derrida pursues his legal theory through a critique 
which represents one fork in a ‘bifurcation’ (Norrie, 2000: 86); a ‘more “intrinsic,” “internal”, 
and “complex”’ legal critique as opposed to a critique which ‘exposes the ideological, 
superstructural nature of law’ (Fraser, 1991: 1325). This meta-ethical route taken from the 
bifurcation leads to Fraser labelling Derrida’s work as objectively ‘metaphysical’ (1328). 7        
 
Dialectics and socio-legal theory 
Norrie’s reading of Derrida is slightly different due to his theoretical grounding in dialectical 
thought, which leads him – perhaps ‘controversially’ – to read deconstruction dialectically 
(Norrie, 2005a: 134). Norrie identifies that both Derrida and Hegel deploy an initial ‘moment of 
dialectical negation’ which exposes the contradictions of legal concepts (Norrie, 2005a: 144; 
2010: 110). This accords with Derrida’s metaphysical critique whereby ‘[t]he presence that it thus 
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delivered to us in the present is a chimera’ (Derrida, 1976: 154) and consequently the illustration 
of law’s ‘logico-formal paradoxes’ thereafter (Derrida, 1990: 959). But Norrie believes Derrida’s 
deconstructive critique then ‘refuses the second dialectical move of reconciliative Reason … 
declining to repair the dialectical contradiction that deconstruction has brought out’ (Norrie, 
2005a: 144). Hence after Derrida’s deconstructive critique via his ‘nonsynonymous substitute[s]’ 
(Derrida, 1982a: 12) such as différance, pharmakon, and supplement, we are left with unresolved 
contradictions and deconstruction simply ‘ends up marching us back into the arms of the law 
and its existing antinomies’ (Norrie, 2005a: 145).   
 
Norrie also critiques Derrida’s ontology because its lack of presence (Norrie, 2005b: 96–100) 
means that it cannot grasp law’s socio-historicity in the present ‘Now’ (Derrida, 1976: 67) of 
‘reality’ (Norrie, 2010: 110). 8 Despite his agreement with Derrida’s ontological complexity 
(Norrie, 2005b: 98) Norrie still believes that Derrida cannot comment on the real, every-day 
‘Now’ of the socio-historical: ‘[d]econstruction posits in “every here-now” an “irreducibly 
heterogeneous otherness” that is present but unrealised, and of necessity unrealisable’ (99). Thus 
deconstruction fails as a socio-historical critique of law, or as ‘socio-legal theory’: ‘The two fit ill’ 
(Norrie, 2003b: 106).  
 
In both Fraser’s and Norrie’s view Derrida’s deconstructive legal theory bifurcates towards an 
‘intrinsic’ critique instead of a critique which would expose the ‘superstructures of law that both 
hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of society’ (Derrida, 
1990: 941). This distinction is clear throughout their accounts of the meta-ethical critique (Fraser, 
1984, 1989, 1991; Norrie 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2010). In Norrie’s language deconstruction 
is therefore a ‘critical legal theory’ and not a theory of ‘socio-legal studies’ (Norrie, 2000: 86). 
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Consequently, deconstruction is ‘insufficiently attuned’ to the problems of an ‘ontologically real, 
geo-historical world with its changing forms’ (Norrie, 2010: 110).  
   
Given the importance of the aforementioned bifurcation within the meta-ethical reading it 
requires further analysis, particularly regarding its establishment and justification. Thus we now 
turn to Derrida’s ‘Force of Law’ (Derrida, 1990), for this essay is seen as fundamental in 
establishing the bifurcation between the meta-ethical and the socio-historical.    
 
Bifurcation: socio-legal and critical legal theory  
The bifurcation 
The meta-ethical reading posits that Derrida’s 1990 essay ‘Force of Law’ is responsible for ‘the 
bifurcation of critical routes’ affecting deconstruction (Norrie, 2000: 86). Fraser is curt regarding 
what she believes occurred in Derrida’s essay: 
 
In … Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, Jacques Derrida distinguishes two different ways of 
thinking about the relations between force and law, and justice and violence. The approach, styled “critique”, 
exposes the ideological, superstructural nature of law by showing that it operates in the service of social, 
economic, and political forces that are posited as external and prior to law. The second approach, in contrast, 
styled “deconstruction”, address a relation between violence and law that is held to be more “intrinsic”, 
“internal”, and “complex”, since it uncovers “the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position 
of the law” in a “violence without ground”. In Derrida’s view, the second, deconstructive approach is the 
preferred one: it penetrates deeper than the critical approach to the heart of the relation between violence 
and law (Fraser, 1991: 1325). 9    
 
In a very similar account from Norrie, given nine years later in this journal (Norrie, 2000), he too 
highlights the aforementioned bifurcation:  
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Nicola Lacey (1996: 143) has suggested that there is a ‘seemingly unbridgeable gap’ between critical legal 
theory and socio-legal studies … The question is starkly raised in Jacques Derrida’s influential essay ‘Force of 
Law’ (Derrida, 1990), where he describes a ‘critique of law’ that is ‘possible and always useful’, involving ‘a 
critique of juridical ideology, a desedimentation of the superstructures of law that both hide and reflect the 
economic and political interests of the dominant forms of society’ (Derrida, 1990: 941). Useful it may be, but 
Derrida leaves this ‘sociological’ critique well alone in favour of his pursuit of a ‘more intrinsic structure’ 
which involves the ‘very emergence of justice and law’ in a ‘performative and therefore interpretive violence’ 
(1990: 941). 
… The distinction represents a clear and, given the importance of its author, emblematic break for critical 
legal studies. … [C]onsequen[tly] the ethical critique operates not with the ‘desedimentation of the 
superstructures of law’ but, whatever the underlying intention, against it: the sociological critique is 
marginalised in ‘Force of Law’ (Norrie, 2000: 86).   
 
These readings both imprint and affirm the ‘bifurcation of critical routes in “Force of Law’’’ 
(Norrie, 2000: 86) (even if Norrie is influenced from a source other than Fraser). 10 From this the 
meta-ethical reading of deconstructive legal theory posits that there is a ‘metaphysical barrier to a 
serious critique of law’ in Derrida’s work (Norrie, 2000: 96). Given the significance of this 
bifurcation it is important to assess the validity of this specific reading of Derrida. The following 
section examines Derrida’s essay and gauges the justification behind the meta-ethical reading.     
 
Force of Law 
Derrida’s essay elucidates what a deconstructive engagement with law may look like. He refers to 
Blaise Pascal and Michel de Montaigne, and particularly to the latter’s statement that law is 
maintained by a ‘mystical foundation of authority’ (Derrida, 1990: 939). This critique illustrates 
modern law’s maintenance via the ‘credit’ of authority: ‘Laws are not just as laws. One obeys 
them not because they are just but because they have authority’ (939). Yet Derrida sees in both 
Pascal and Montaigne a critique of law which ‘goes beyond … the law [as] a “masked power,” 
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beyond the cynical moral of La Fontaine’s “The Wolf and the Sheep,” according to which “La 
raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure”’ (“Might makes right”) (941). This critique perhaps even 
goes ‘beyond a conventionalist or utilitarian relativism, beyond a nihilism, old or new’ (941). It 
examines law via a two-fold account which Derrida then describes as ‘the basis for a modern 
critical philosophy’ (941). At this point the meta-ethical reading seizes on Derrida’s work because 
it views the two-fold account as positing two-halves which are antagonistic and incompatible 
with one another; one half is positioned ‘against’ the other, not ‘with’ it, ‘whatever the underlying 
intention’ (Norrie, 2000: 86). To gauge this reading, we here refer to Derrida’s text in full:  
 
  But if we set aside the functional mechanism of the Pascalian critique, if we dissociate it from Christian 
pessimism, which is not impossible, then we can find in it, as in Montaigne, the basis for a modern critical 
philosophy, indeed for a critique of juridical ideology, a desedimentation of the superstructures of law that 
both hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the dominant forces of society. This would be 
both possible and always useful.  
  But beyond its principle and its mechanism, this Pascalian pensée perhaps concerns a more intrinsic 
structure, one that a critique of juridical ideology should never overlook. The very emergence of justice and 
law, the founding and justifying moment that institutes law implies a performative force, which is always an 
interpretative force: this time not in the sense of law in the service of force, its docile instrument, servile and 
thus exterior to the dominant power but rather in the sense of law that would maintain a more internal, more 
complex relation with what one calls force, power or violence. Justice – in the sense of droit (right or law) 
would not simply be put in the service of a social force or power, for example an economic, political, 
ideological power that would exist outside or before it and which it would have to accommodate or bend to 
when useful (Derrida, 1990: 941).       
 
The above readings from Fraser and Norrie illustrate Derrida’s prioritisation of the latter-half of 
the two-fold account: ‘…Derrida proceeds to put aside this socio-historical critique in favour of 
his deconstructive pursuit of a ‘more intrinsic structure’’ (Norrie, 2010: 188); ‘In Derrida’s view, 
the second, deconstructive approach is the preferred one’ (Fraser, 1991: 1325). Accordingly, the 
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crucial point is whether Derrida did enact a bifurcation of the critical routes in question? The 
following argument submits that Derrida posited a mutual dependence between the critiques and 
that this is visible by a deeper reading of his thought via the concept of surenchère.      
 
A retort to the bifurcations: Derrida’s surenchère  
Derrida states that beyond La Fontaine’s ‘cynical moral’, and aside from Montaigne’s ‘Christian 
pessimism’, and beyond the ‘Pascalian pensée’, we can find the ‘basis for a modern critical 
philosophy’. This modern critical philosophy is then in turn intensified into ‘a critique of juridical 
ideology’ and ‘a desedimentation of the superstructures of law that both hide and reflect the 
economic and political interests of the dominant forces of society’. This act of intensifying and 
heightening concepts is common across Derrida’s oeuvre and this instance regarding Montaigne’s 
and Pascal’s critiques is no exception: Derrida is enacting the concept of surenchère: 
 
This heightening of tension can be described through recourse to another word that recurs frequently in 
Derrida’s writings, “surenchère” – a raising of the stakes, outbidding, or upping the ante. When he inherits, 
Derrida raises what is at stake in the concept in question, upping the ante on the tensions it contains. It is in 
this way that he aggressively transforms the concepts of others through pushing them to exceed their 
supposed limits (Haddad, 2013: 35).  
 
Another account of surenchère comes from Derrida’s translator Michael Naas; the action means 
‘not simply appropriating [concepts] in a minimal way but actually upping the ante of them 
through what Derrida calls a surenchère réaffirmatrice’ (Naas, 2012: 53). 11 Derrida’s deconstructive 
thought accepts and then relaunches the critiques inherited from Montaigne and Pascal, in order 
to push their limits. 12 This surenchère aligns acutely with Derrida’s repeated references to pushing 
‘beyond’ the nihilism, ‘beyond’ the cynical moral, ‘aside’ of the functional mechanism, and then 
‘beyond [the] principle and [the] mechanism’ of the Pascalian pensée (Derrida, 1990: 941). Fraser 
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and Norrie would no doubt endorse these intensifications because they critique the external 
economic and political (as well as no doubt historical) conditions attached to the social 
phenomenon of law. Yet they believe these external critiques cannot co-exist with the intrinsic 
critiques thereafter; recall the evaluation that the two positions work ‘against’ and not ‘with’ one 
another, ‘whatever the underlying intention’ (Norrie, 2000: 86). Yet it is submitted that their 
reading overlooks a crucial element within Derrida’s thought, for the act of surenchère – which does 
result in a socio-historical critique of law – can only be achieved in tandem with, and supported 
by, a deeper critique of the metaphysics of presence. In effect the two critiques are not mutually 
exclusive, rather they are mutually dependant, and Derrida makes this clear in his continuing 
explanation of the connection between the two critiques.  
 
Derrida’s inclusion of the intrinsic critique creates a new critique which is ‘not in the sense of law 
in the service of force, its docile instrument, servile and thus exterior to the dominant power’, as 
conveyed by the crude nihilism, pessimism and cynicism accompanying La Fontaine’s quip that 
‘Might makes right’ (Derrida, 1990: 941). (Fraser refers to this crude critique as a ‘(mere) critique’ 
(Fraser, 1991: 1328)). Rather, as expressed in Derrida’s continuing account (which neither Fraser 
nor Norrie refer to), the new critique is ‘in the sense of law that would maintain a more internal, 
more complex relation with what one calls force, power or violence’ (Derrida, 1990: 941). 
However, despite this clarification the meta-ethical reading nevertheless lambasts Derrida for 
failing to include a socio-historical critique (Fraser, 1991: 1327; Norrie, 2005a: 6, 144).   
 
But here Derrida’s critics have failed to see the act of surenchère and its subsequent result; this 
being that the ‘modern critical philosophy’ is not comprised of only a socio-historical critique. For 
this on its own, as valiant as it may appear, would nevertheless be far too crude and basic. 
Instead the ‘modern critical philosophy’ states so much more than simply just ‘Might makes 
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right’ and thus ‘justice … would not simply be put in the service of a social force or power, for 
example an economic, political, [or] ideological power’ (Derrida, 1990: 941). Rather, in the name 
of justice, the critique also acknowledges the prescient metaphysical complications affecting the 
social phenomenon of law, as exemplified by deconstruction qua metaphysical critique. Derrida 
explains this a few pages later in response to those who would describe deconstruction as ‘a 
quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical question of justice’ (953). He states 
that deconstruction and the intrinsic critique pays heed, in the name of ‘[the] infinite demand of 
justice’, to ‘constantly [maintaining] an interrogation of the origin, grounds and limits of our 
conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus surrounding justice’ (955). And that this is 
achieved via an act of surenchère which ‘hyperbolically raises the stakes of exacting justice’ 
(Derrida, 1990: 955; Haddad, 2013: 42–43) and questions (amongst other things) ‘European 
idioms’ associated with justice: ‘Dikē, Jus, justitia, justice, Gerechtigkeit’ (Derrida, 1990: 955). 
Consequently a deconstructive modern critical philosophy ‘should never overlook’ a deeper 
metaphysical account of law because this guards against mere critiques which posit law in the 
service of an ‘economic, political, [or] ideological power’ (941), à la ‘Might makes right’, or 
indeed Euro-centric notions of justice. Such an attentive reading, posited within an intricate 
‘Derridean groove’, has been previously offered by Peter Fitzpatrick: ‘[the] law in its very vacuity 
… would challenge and deny the plenitude, the completeness of the social, the historical, and the 
political’ (Fitzpatrick, 2003: 551). 13 In summary Derrida’s deconstructive legal theory avoids the 
pitfall of presumed plenitude and the crudity of a mere socio-historical critique by executing an 
act of surenchère which incorporates, in a mutual dependence, both a socio-historical and a meta-
ethical critique. 14 Indeed, Derrida alludes to this later in the essay:    
 
Deconstruction is generally practiced in two ways or two styles, although it most often grafts one on to the 
other. One takes on the demonstrative and apparently ahistorical allure of logico-formal paradoxes. The 
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other, more historical or more anamnesic, seems to proceed through readings of texts, meticulous 
interpretations and genealogies (Derrida, 1990: 957–958).  
 
The act of surenchère, alongside deconstruction’s ‘grafting’ of its two styles onto one another, 
illustrates that the meta-ethical reading misses Derrida’s subtle, mutual combination of the two 
critiques. Thus it does not seem there is a ‘problem with Derrida’ whereby ‘there is an enormous 
price to be paid in terms of the marginalisation of the social and the political in the first critique 
he sets aside’ (Norrie, 2000: 98). Because as is evident from Derrida’s juridcio-political 
engagements he consistently does anything but refute socio-historical accounts or a style ‘more 
historical or more anamnesic’. Examples would include his account of Nelson Mandela’s legal 
resistance against apartheid (Derrida, 1987); his critique of the ‘sans papier’ situation in France 
(Derrida, 2001a); his work on the law and politics of South Africa’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’ (Derrida, 2001b); his historical investigation of the legal formation of the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence (Derrida, 2002a); his open letter to President Clinton regarding the 
political imprisonment of Mumia Abu-Jamal (Derrida, 2002b); and his critical analysis of 
international law and U.S. foreign policy following ‘9/11’ (Derrida, 2003).     
 
Surenchère and beyond  
At this point the article moves to its second retort. The second retort focuses on what is argued 
to be the core thesis underpinning the meta-ethical reading; that Derrida’s deconstructive legal 
theory is not concerned with ‘politics’, that is the socio-historical, but rather that it is concerned 
with ‘the political’, that is the meta-ethical. In Fraser’s work this distinction is explicitly based 
upon the aforementioned bifurcation whereby deconstruction ‘will never get to ethics or politics’ 
(Fraser, 1991: 1326). But for Norrie the distinction is more implicit but it is nevertheless 
consistent throughout his work: ‘the concern is that it [Derrida’s legal theory] is presented in a 
way that marginalises the social and historical dimension in any account of justice, and thereby 
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desituates it’ (Norrie, 2010: 189). In the deconstructive theory this distinction between ‘politics’ 
and ‘the political’ is thoroughly documented and well known; this is the distinction, respectively, 
between la and le politique:  
 
“the political” (le politique: the site where what it means to be in common is open to definition) and “politics” 
(la politique: the play of forces and interests engaged in a conflict over the representation and governance of 
social existence) (Fynsk, 1991: x). 
 
It is argued that the meta-ethical reading is premised upon this important distinction and that the 
bifurcation rehearses this separation in forfeiting la politique’s engagement with ‘material and 
spatio-temporal specificity’ (Norrie, 2010: 110) in favour of le politique’s ‘abstract, mysterious, 
ungrounded, antinomial connection to the messianic “other”’ (228). This separation is in fact 
supported by, and directly aligns with, a surface-level reading of Derrida’s work, for 
deconstruction did establish and prioritise engagements with le politique: this is not disputed. 
However, as will be argued, the meta-ethical reading is flawed because it ignores the 
complications within deconstructive theory which trouble this distinction.        
  
Deconstruction: le/la politique. 
Les Fins de l’homme: Derrida’s influence  
Here the recollection of Derrida’s influence on the concepts of la and le politique in French 
philosophy will be curt, for the space afforded is limited. 15 Beginning in October 1968, in a 
paper entitled ‘The Ends of Man’ (Derrida, 1982b), Derrida raised a pressing issue via an account 
of political events from the same year; ‘the Vietnam peace talks’; ‘the assassination of Martin 
Luther King’; and the May occupations of Parisian universities (114). He stated:  
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Every philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political significance. And not only due to that which has 
always linked the essence of the philosophical to the essence of the political. Essential and general, this 
political import nevertheless burdens the a priori link between philosophy and politics, aggravates it in a way, 
and also determines it when the philosophical colloquium is announced as an international colloquium. Such 
is the case here (111).   
 
By turning to analogous events of discrimination, persecution, and ethno-centric ‘philosophical 
anthropology’ (113) within academia, Derrida raised the hugely important point of the politics of 
philosophy. This point would then become the subject of its own conference held years later, in 
July 1980, and named after Derrida’s paper: “Les Fins de l’homme: À partir du travail de Jacques 
Derrida” (“The Ends of Man: From the work of Jacques Derrida”). The organisers, Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, were concerned with questions such as:  
 
What is it that from the very beginning – but from the very beginning of what, precisely: of philosophy? 
politics? – has bound the essence of the political to the essence of the philosophical? (Sparks, 1997b: xix). 
 
Inspired by Derrida, they, and the other participants, tackled the difficult question of the politics 
of deconstruction itself. Whereas Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak urged for revolution, 16 and Jacob 
Rogozinski called for restraint, 17 Derrida’s own answer neither endorsed ‘anti-Marxist’ 
sentiments, nor aligned with a ‘theoretically naïve’ Marxist philosophy (Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy, 1981a: 526). Instead he explained that his prior and continuing position was not to 
weaken, either theoretically or politically, Marxism’s potential for the proletariat but rather be 
wary of ‘the idea of revolution qua metaphysical concept’ (Fraser, 1984: 33). 18 Then, with 
deliberate care, Derrida explained that within his writings there has always been a strategy 
regarding the politics of deconstruction:  
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This complex strategy was evident in his texts, he said, by a kind of retreat, a silence with respect to Marxism 
– a blank which also signified that Marxism was not attacked like such and such theoretical comfort (in the 
fields of ethnology, psychoanalysis, linguistics, literary criticism). This blank was not neutral, according to 
him, it was a noticeable political gesture (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1981a: 527). 19 
 
It was then Lacoue-Labarthe who enthusiastically seized upon Derrida’s cautious political 
gesture: ‘I believe profoundly in the necessity of the “retreat of the political”’ (Lacoue-Labarthe, 
1997a: 95).  
 
Retreating the political.    
In November 1980 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy opened the “Centre for Philosophical Research on the 
Political” at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. Against a ‘totalitarian phenomenon’ where ‘the 
political is completed to the point of excluding every other area of reference’ (111), Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy opposed the figure of totalitarian ‘immanentist politics’ (Hutchens, 2005: 
127). They unequivocally followed Derrida’s deconstructive gesture from the July of that year 
and instigated ‘think[ing] in terms of re-treating the political’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997a: 
112). And they were clear that they were going to utilise deconstruction in order to ‘re-trace’, ‘re-
mark’, and ‘question in a new way’ the essence of the political (112).   
 
Firstly, the centre explicitly utilised the deconstructive concept of ‘the trace … as it has been 
elaborated by Derrida’ (120) to answer the following question: ‘what non-dialectical negativity, 
what non-unity and non-totality withdraws or recedes or is divided or subtracted in the 
fabrication of the “social bond”’ at the core of the political’ (Fraser, 1984: 142). As commented 
by Oliver Marchart, their thought illustrated that ‘[w]e are therefore confronted, on the most 
“fundamental” level, with a receding ground, a ground that nevertheless remains present in its 
absence, thereby receding and returning in receding’ (Marchart, 2012: 172).   
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 Secondly, deconstruction was utilised to distinguish between two essential concepts within their 
project: ‘politics’, which they wished to ‘retreat’ from; and ‘the political’, which they wished to 
interrogate and rethink (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997a: 110). It is precisely this 
deconstructive impetus and concordant separation which underpins the meta-ethical reading. 
For this reading delineates the socio-historical from the meta-ethical in law just as deconstruction 
itself delineated ‘politics’ from ‘the political’. Here we recall Fraser asking ‘What is the nature of 
“the force of law”? Is that “force” metaphysical or political?’ (Fraser, 1991: 1327): her answer is 
clear; ‘“the force of law” in Derrida’s account is essentially metaphysical’ (1328).    
 
This distinction was vitally important to the centre’s strategy of firstly avoiding a manifesto in the 
Leninist sense of ‘What is to be Done?’ (Nancy, 1997) and secondly actively interrogating the 
essence of the political. The meta-ethical reading sees this strategy echoed in Derrida’s legal 
theory, epitomised by its concern for ‘a metaphysical basis for a theory of law’ (Norrie, 2003b: 
106; Fraser, 1991: 1328), just as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy were concerned with ‘the political’: 
‘Such is, moreover, the reason for which, in speaking of the political we fully intend not to 
designate politics’ (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997a: 110). Their original French clearly 
differentiates between ‘the political’, du politique (or le politique) and ‘politics’, la politique:  
 
Telle est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle, en parlant du politique, nous entendons bien ne pas désigner la 
politique (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1981b: 15). 20  
 
Simon Critchley explains that this distinction resided at the core of the centre’s deconstructive 
project: ‘a withdrawal with respect to la politique (i.e. totalitarianism) in order to think the essence 
of le politique as such’ (Critchley, 1999: 78). This distinction between la and le politique then 
continued to be applied in deconstructive theory, whether from Chantal Mouffe, 21 Costas 
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Douzinas, 22 or Elena Loizidou. 23 And when consulting Barbara Cassin’s Dictionary of 
Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, we find that Philippe Raynaud’s entry for ‘Politics’ precisely 
explains the distinction. Firstly, regarding la politique, Raynaud explains that in the sense being 
discussed here, ‘which translates as the English word “politics,” la politique designates everything 
that concerns public debate, competition for access to power, and thus the “domain on which 
various politiques [in the sense of “policy”] compete or oppose each other”’ (Cassin, 2014: 803). 
Then Raynaud posits a clear differentiation regarding what is meant by le politique, ‘the political’:    
 
In itself, then, the idea of a distinction between the political and politics, which would enable us to conceive 
the political dimension of human life transhistorically … does suggest that the political is endowed with a 
dignity superior to that of politics, either because it is distinguished from everyday politics, or because it is 
the specific object of philosophy and grand theory, whereas most of the social sciences can hardly rise above 
the level of the empirical study of political life. In this sense, the concept of the political is no doubt part of 
the common fund of contemporary philosophy (804).    
 
From the accounts above it is clear that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s distinction between la and 
le politique has prescient resonances with the meta-ethical reading. For this reading laments 
deconstructive legal theory for its retreat from the socio-historical hic et nunc (Norrie, 2010: 110), 
or said differently, from ‘politics’, la politique: ‘the play of forces and interests engaged in a 
conflict over the presentation and governance of social existence’ (Fynsk, 1991: x). It chastises 
deconstruction for its inability to ‘[consider] those social, political and historical elements which 
constitute the essence of modernity’ (Norrie, 2003a: 124), whereas these elements would be 
considered within ‘the factical, the empirical, the contingent, the ontic, that is to say, la politique’ 
(Critchley, 1999: 84). Conversely the meta-ethical reading readily acknowledges that 
deconstruction is able to comment on ‘the political,’ le politique: ‘deconstructionist philosophers 
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… privileged the archaeologist of the conditions of the possibility of “the political” over the 
participant in political struggles’ (Fraser, 1989: 4).    
  
However it is submitted that the meta-ethical reading falters because it assumes an 
unproblematic separation of la and le politique and fails to account for the political paradox 
induced by the centre’s wielding of deconstruction: ‘Simply put, one cannot easily wrest the 
possible configurations of “the political” from politics’ (Hutchens, 2005: 128). This 
deconstructive paradox will now be explained and deployed to critique the central claim that 
Derrida’s legal theory unproblematically relates to le politique and not la politique.    
 
La and le politique (Slight Return): Deconstruction’s political paradox 
Within the numerous commentaries on Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s deconstructive project 
many scholars have noted the political paradox which arose therein. However Fraser’s in-depth 
account is noteworthy because despite the fact that her aforementioned work is exemplary of the 
meta-ethical reading of Derrida’s legal theory (Fraser, 1991), her earlier work on the 
deconstructive significance of la and le politique is much harder to place (Fraser, 1984, 1989: 4–5, 
69–92). For it is simultaneously both a solid prototype of her dismissal of Derrida’s engagement 
with la politique (Fraser, 1984: 142, 149–150) and another commentary which recognises the 
paradox of the separation of la and le politique (133, 136, 139–140). Yet on reflection she is 
adamant that her work posits the thesis that Derrida’s deconstructive theory cannot engage with la 
politique (Fraser, 1991: 1326). Her work will be referenced in the following section but first it is 
important to establish why the paradox occurred.   
 
The paradox was caused by the combination of the centre’s two opposing actions in its strategic 
retreat. Firstly it wholly endorsed Derrida’s deconstructive retreat whilst seeing-off accusations 
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of apolitical nihilism: ‘In no way would this constitute – and we hasten to say this in order to 
prevent any misunderstanding – or indicate a falling back into “apoliticism”’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy, 1997a: 112). Secondly the centre enacted a withdrawal from la politique whilst quelling 
accusations that it simultaneously was promoting a manifesto of la politique in the name of anti-
immanentist politics; it clarified its concern was ‘not a new institution (or instruction) of politics 
by thought, but the political institution of so-called Western thought’ (110).    
 
Thus the paradox formed because the centre sought to engage in a political retreat whilst 
avoiding both apoliticism and anti-immanentist politics; it was caught between being neither 
apolitical nor of politics, and yet remaining committed to a critical engagement with le politique. 
Yet, as was explained by the centre’s organisers, ‘the gesture of the retreat is itself a political 
gesture – by which it is doubtless a matter of exceeding something of the political, but absolutely 
not in the manner of a “foray outside of the political”’ (113). Thus the centre’s actions were 
‘political’: not because it advocated a stance regarding la politique but rather because its 
investigations could not but be ‘political’ (of le politique). Fraser recognised this: ‘It follows, for 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, that the re-trait du politique must itself be a political gesture, albeit a 
somewhat unusual one’ (Fraser, 1984: 140). This is an affect of the deconstructive trace which 
the centre utilised in its theoretical strategy. For the trace, which resided at the core of the social 
bond’s constitution and retreat, 24 led to a contamination and mutual dependence between la and 
le politique, despite valiant efforts to cleanly separate them.  
 
This effect of the deconstructive trace has been explicated by Spivak, Derrida, and indeed 
Norrie’s own reading of deconstruction. 25 Spivak has asserted that due to the trace everything is 
‘always already inhabited by the track of something that is not itself’ (Spivak, 1976: lxix). On the 
trace Derrida states:  
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The trace must be thought before the entity. … The field of the entity, before being determined as the field 
of presence, is structured according to the diverse possibilities – genetic and structural – of the trace 
(Derrida, 1976: 47). 
 
Even Norrie’s reading of deconstruction opines that ‘being nowhere exists in a completely 
present form’ and that Derrida’s metaphysical critique ‘is (rightly) committed to the denial of an 
alternative, simplistic, ontology of pure presence’ (Norrie, 2005b: 98). Consequently the 
separation of la and le politique into pure, self-contained, and mutually exclusive categories is 
problematic, indeed paradoxical, and has been noted by the centre’s organisers and other 
theorists. Yet this complication never materialises in the meta-ethical reading. Rather, there is a 
‘metaphysical barrier’ between the two legal critiques in question (Norrie, 2000: 96). 
Consequently, this paradox engulfing la and le politique – which has been noted by numerous 
commentators – forms the second point of retort against the meta-ethical reading.  
 
Christopher Fynsk, who was present at the centre’s inception, made it clear in 1980 at the Les 
Fins de l’homme conference that even within Derrida’s thought there was a conflation between la 
and le politique: 
 
Now, if Derrida thus hesitates to engage himself in immediately political questions (if he does not politicise his 
thinking), he nonetheless affirms that his practice is political, that philosophical activity is, in general a 
political practice (Fynsk, 1997: 88). 26 
 
Thereafter in 1991, when writing the Foreword to Nancy’s The Inoperative Community (Nancy, 
1991) (a continuation of the deconstructive engagement with le politique), Fynsk stated: ‘Nancy’s 
engagement with the political [le politique] proceeds from an acute sense of the contemporary 
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socio-political context and is indissociable from a political position-taking’ (Fynsk, 1991: x). Fynsk’s 
two accounts offer introductory thoughts on the paradox in question. 
 
Marie-Eve Morin’s work has shown that a correct understanding of the centre’s work, against 
Fraser’s reading no less, reveals that it does not remain ‘within the opposition between 
philosophy and politics, the transcendental and the empirical’ but rather that it ‘undermine[s] this 
opposition’ (Morin, 2012: 163, note 7). 27 But note that Fraser’s work on the centre also reached 
this conclusion, seemingly against her stance of an apolitical deconstruction: ‘There is and can be 
no non-political “outre-clôture” to which one could safely emigrate; and it is unavoidable that the 
Center’s work will produce political effects. So to interrogate the essence of the political cannot 
be to discard or sublimate political or class struggles’ (Fraser, 1984: 140). In short, the centre’s 
work cannot but engage with ‘political or class struggles’ because by its very nature le politique 
cannot be ‘non-political’. And Critchley’s analysis also makes the connection via the presence of 
Derrida’s trace and then rhetorically asks how la and le politique could hope to remain separate?:   
 
Following Derrida’s reading of Husserl’s attempted reduction of meaning to expression and the exclusion of 
the indicative sign, might it not be asked whether there remains a trace of grapheme of empiricity and facticity 
in the reduction of la politique to le politique that disrupts or deconstructs the possibility of such a reduction? Is 
there not an inextricable contamination of le politique by la politique and vice versa? (Critchley, 1999: 85). 
 
From Fynsk’s, Morin’s, Fraser’s and Critchley’s commentaries the contamination between la and 
le politique is evident. Further, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy were also clear that the centre could 
not cleanly delineate between its engagement with ‘the political’ and its retreat from ‘politics’: 
 
Now, the ruling out or sublimating of either class struggles or political struggles has never been what is at 
stake for us: these are the givens of the epoch of the domination of the political and technology or of the 
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domination of political economy. But the stake could be one of no longer subjugating these struggles, in their 
finality, to this domination (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997a: 117).  
 
For a brief conclusion on this paradox one can turn to Robert Bernasconi’s work. In 
commenting on Bill Readings’ attempt to save the separation between la and le politique from the 
very contamination Fraser notes (Readings, 1989: 242–243, note 31) Bernasconi argues that 
within the workings of deconstruction Readings’ attempt is futile:      
 
his attempt to defend [the separation] by modelling it on the ontological difference is ultimately doomed to 
fail because it is deconstruction above all that has shown how the ontic invariably “contaminates” ontological 
purity (Bernasconi, 1989: 19 note 3).     
 
Bernasconi’s point recalls deconstruction’s critique against defined distinctions between the 
ontic, la politique, and the ontological, le politique (Douzinas, 2013: 110; Marchart, 2012: 173), as is 
similarly shown in Critchley’s comment regarding the workings of the trace in between la and le 
politique. Consequently it is problematic for Readings and the meta-ethical reading to state that 
deconstruction, as an ontological critique, executes a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the 
political’.  
 
This point presents the second retort to the meta-ethical reading because it gives no credence to 
the significant historical instance in which deconstruction was deployed to separate the socio-
historical from the meta-ethical, and failed, due to metaphysical contamination and the ensuing 
political paradox. Here we need only remind ourselves that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s centre 
closed after four years due to deconstruction’s inability to keep concerns of la politique from 
influencing the participants’ work (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997c).            
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Conclusion: retorting to reduction. 
Derrida, la politique, law 
Having presented both parts of the retort against the meta-ethical reading this article will now 
conclude by synthesising these parts together with reference to another section of Derrida’s 
‘Force of Law’ which neither Fraser nor Norrie engage with. This section illustrates Derrida’s 
concern for, and engagement with, socio-historical instances via the very medium of 
deconstruction itself.   
 
The section in question closes the first half of Derrida’s essay and serves as a bridge into his 
discussion of Walter Benjamin’s work (Derrida, 1990: 973–1045). Here he states that even 
though he conceives of justice as unrestricted by the calculative methods of law this ‘should not 
serve as an alibi for staying out of juridcio-political battles’ (971). Rather, Derrida sees it as 
imperative that one engages with law; ‘Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it 
cannot and should not ever be total’ (971). He then comments that in order to keep 
politicization from ‘triviality’ what is required is that ‘each advance in politicization obliges one to 
reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been 
calculated or delimited’ (971). Derrida then lists prominent legal socio-historical examples which 
have engaged in such a reinterpretation, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
abolition of slavery. 28  
 
Here both Derrida’s concept of surenchère and the contamination of la and le politique are integral 
to this deconstructive legal theory. Regarding surenchère Derrida states that in order for ‘juridico-
political battles’ in the name of justice to be accomplished beyond ‘triviality’ – ala the crudity of 
‘Might makes right’ (941) – they must not merely execute their socio-historical analysis but they 
must also extend to a meta-ethical analysis which examines ‘the very foundations of law’ (971). 
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Consequently the concept of surenchère drives Derrida’s critique beyond a ‘trivial’ legal critique 
because of the mutual dependency between the socio-historical and the meta-ethical.  
 
Then, regarding the contamination between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, Derrida also states that 
in order to pursue justice within ‘juridico-political battles’ one must, ‘il faut’, calculate within law 
(Derrida, 2002c: 257). However this must be with the understanding that ‘law, [is] the juridical 
field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers’, for there are other ‘fields from which we 
cannot separate it, which intervene in it’ (Derrida, 1990: 971). Derrida then proceeds to list these 
fields which cannot be separated from the juridical field of law: ‘ethics, politics, economics, 
psycho-sociology, philosophy, literature, etc’ (971). Here he clearly illustrates that deconstruction, 
as a legal practice, cannot isolate and separate law from politics, nor law from philosophy, nor 
indeed politics from philosophy, as was the fate of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s deployment of 
deconstruction. Consequently it is once again the case that la and le politique are drawn together 
via deconstruction.  
 
This article has offered a retort to the meta-ethical reading of Derrida’s deconstructive legal 
featuring two interconnected points based upon a broader and more nuanced account of 
deconstruction. In doing so it is hoped that Derrida’s legal theory has been shown to be not only 
receptive to the concerns of la politique, or the socio-historical, but rather integrally based upon 
such concerns and thus not apolitical.   
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1 For relatively recent volumes reflecting upon Derrida’s influence see (Goodrich, Hoffmann, Rosenfeld 
and Vismann, 2008) and (Legrand, 2009).     
2 This alternate reading leans more towards ‘sympathy’ with, rather than ‘hostility’ against, deconstruction.  
3 See also (McCarthy, 1991: 97–119) and, possibly, (Laclau, 1996: 58). Here Laclau appears to draw on the 
distinction (addressed below) between ‘the political’, and ‘politics’, in which deconstruction offers utility 
with regards to the former only.  
4 This critique originally featured in Norrie’s 2000 article in this journal (Norrie, 2000: 86–87, 94–99).      
5 See generally (Cusset, 2008: 138–154). For collections on ‘Derridean politics’ see (Cheah and Guerlac, 
2009) and (Weber, 2013b).     
6 Note that Fraser actually frames deconstruction’s position as a paradoxical: ‘Thus, the argument about 
whether Deconstruction entails nihilism or an ethics of responsibility ends in a stalemate. So long as the 
discussion remains on this plane, it cannot be resolved’ (Fraser, 1991: 1326).   
7 Note here that Norrie also classifies Derrida’s legal theory as trying to posit a metaphysical account of 
law (Norrie, 2003b: 106).  
8 Norrie’s full quote is: ‘On the “reality principle”, it is natural necessity in the world that yields those 
forms in their historical specificity which supplementarity or différance exposes, but deconstruction lacks a 
sufficient interest in material and spatio-temporal specificity’ (Norrie, 2010: 110).    
9 Within Fraser’s passage she takes all the quotes from (Derrida, 1990: 941).   
10 Norrie is influenced by the work of Nicola Lacey and her own account of the bifurcation: the 
‘seemingly unbridgeable gap … between critical legal theory and socio-legal studies’ (Lacey, 1996: 143). 
But this influence appears to be fleeting, for two reasons. Firstly, Lacey’s account of ‘critical legal theory’ 
clearly contains a ‘historical’ element within its methodology (Lacey, 1996: 131). Norrie’s account does 
not refer to this point, yet his thesis explicitly argues the opposite in excluding a ‘historical’ element from 
‘critical legal theory’. Secondly, although Lacey’s article refers to Derrida’s work (Lacey, 1996: 135, 139) it 
is never more than by way of categorising his work into one of the differing ‘areas of scholarship relevant 
to [her] project’, which include ‘critical legal theory’ and ‘[s]ocio-legal studies’ (Lacey, 1996: 131, 132).   
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11 For another general account of Derrida’s use of surenchère see (Weber, 1995).      
12 For Derrida’s own account of how surenchère relates to inheritance see (Derrida and Roudinesco, 2004: 
3): ‘What does it mean to reaffirm? It means not simply accepting this heritage but relaunching it 
otherwise and keeping it alive. Not choosing it (since what characterizes a heritage is first of all that one 
does not choose it; it is what violently elects us), but choosing to keep it alive’.    
13 For further attentive readings within this ‘Derridean groove’, see also (Fitzpatrick, 2001: 73–84).    
14 See also the insightful work of Arkady Plotnitksy, who illustrates that this ‘contamination’ between the 
two critiques is neither unusual nor unexplained in Derrida’s work. See (Plotnitksy, 1991: 1209): ‘The 
economy of circulation between both strategies remains, however, a decisive and apparently ineluctable 
part of deconstruction from Derrida’s earliest writing’. For the reference in Plotnitsky’s essay to ‘Derrida’s 
earliest writing’, see (Derrida, 1982b: 135).     
15 For perhaps the most in-depth account of Derrida’s influence on this area of French theory, see the 
aforementioned (Fraser, 1984). Fraser’s reading will be engaged with below.       
16 Spivak ‘urged deconstruction to deconstruct its own exclusion of political-economy’ and engage with 
Karl Marx’s thinking because ‘a subtle reading of Marx would reveal a deconstructor avant la lettre’ (Fraser, 
1984: 130; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1981a: 505–516). 
17 Rogozinski argued that what was required was the ‘deconstruct[ion of] Revolution as the metaphysical 
project of an impossible radical break’ (Fraser, 1984: 131; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1981a: 516–526).  
18 Note also Derrida’s assertion that, for him, there is no ‘one Marxism and one revolutionary project’ (527). 
Translation by the author.   
19 Translation by the author.     
20 See also Nancy’s continuing analysis, over thirty years later, of la and le politique following from 
Derrida’s deconstructive insights in The Beast & the Sovereign: Volume I (Derrida, 2009: 265). Nancy posits 
that Derrida illustrates ‘“[p]olitics” or the “political” (la ou le “politique”) is not the whole of what has just 
been designated as polis in the first sense’; here referring to the Aristotelian polis. (Nancy, 2014: 8).   
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21 Mouffe adopts the following distinction in her work: ‘by “the political” I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by “politics” I mean the set of 
practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context 
of conflictuality provided by the political’ (Mouffe, 2005: 9). See also her more recent definition which 
repeats her conceptualisation of these ideas (Mouffe, 2013: 2). 
22 Douzinas, referring to Mouffe’s account (Mouffe, 2005: 8–9), explains that ‘politics’ refers to the 
practices of conventional politics, such as ‘parties and debating, lobbying and horse-trading that takes 
place around Westminster and Whitehall,’ whereas ‘the political’ refers to ‘the way in which the social 
bond is instituted and concerns the deep rifts in society’ (Douzinas, 2013: 110). He also claims that: ‘An 
important innovation of radical philosophy was the distinction between politics (la politique) and the 
political (le politique). Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy initially drew it along the lines of the 
Heideggerians’ division between the “ontic” realm of beings and the “ontological” where Being unfolds’ 
(Douzinas, 2013: 110).  
23 Loizidou explains that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy ‘argue that “everything is political” or, what they 
coin la politique, needs to be retreated, so that the essence of the political, what they call le politique, can be 
retraced’ (Loizidou, 2007: 133). 
24 On the trace Derrida states that: ‘erasure belongs to its structure’ (Derrida, 1982a: 24). 
25 See also (Hillis Miller, 2011) for further emphasis on this point.  
26 See also Stella Gaon’s point (Gaon, 2005: 393) that the centre’s deconstructive paradox occurred 
because it ‘[wa]s “essentially” philosophical because it [wa]s essentially political (the ethical question of 
our relation “founds” in an originary way the Being of community in the West), and it [wa]s “essentially” 
political because it [wa]s essentially philosophical (the ontological question of our being-as-one [comme-un] 
“founds” in an originary way the communal, ethico-political polis)’.  
27 Expanding on this Morin states: ‘In fact, the “political” is not so much “the transcendental” as opposed 
to empirical politics. Rather, it is something, a “relation” or “being-in-common”, that underlies both and 
undoes all foundational discourse’ (Morin, 2012: 163, note 7).   
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28 Derrida then lists instances of politics away from the ‘grand geo-political scale’ of his two prior 
examples; these include ‘abortion’, bio-engineering’, ‘the social treatment of AIDS’, and ‘the macro- or 
micro-politics of drugs’ (Derrida, 1990: 973), all of which are still instances of major concern today. 
